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COULD TERRORISTS DERAIL A PRESIDENTIAL 
ELECTION? 
Jerry H. Goldfeder*
Whereas postponing an election in the aftermath of a terrorist attack 
would demonstrate weakness, not strength, and would be interpreted as a 
victory for the terrorists . . . .  Resolved, That it is the sense of the House 
of Representatives that . . . the actions of terrorists will never cause the 
date of any presidential election to be postponed . . . .
 
1
INTRODUCTION 
 
While the 2004 United States presidential election was held without the 
terrorist attack that many people feared, as election day approached, a 
gnawing feeling gripped lawyers working on behalf of President Bush and 
Senator Kerry.2  After all, this was the first U.S. presidential election since 
the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks in 2001, and the train 
bombing in Madrid several days before Spain’s own national election was 
fresh in their minds.3  Legal issues had to be researched; plans had to be 
made.  Unfortunately, there appears to have been very little planning for 
this possibility.4
Although scholars from the Washington D.C.-based American 
Enterprise Institute have addressed some of the repercussions a terrorist 
 
 
* The author teaches election law as an Adjunct Professor at Fordham University School of 
Law.  He has practiced election law in New York since his admission to the bar in 1980.  
Professor Goldfeder received his J.D. from the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, 
Yeshiva University, in 1979, where he served on the Law Review, and his M.A. in political 
science from the University of California, Los Angeles, in 1972.  
 1. H.R. 728, 108th Cong. (2004).  The Resolution passed 419-2. 
 2. E.g., Robert Block, What if . . . Could the Federal Election be Postponed?, WALL 
ST. J., Oct. 26, 2004, at B1. 
 3. E.g., Keith B. Richburg, Madrid Train Blast Kills at Least 190; 10 Bombs Detonate 
Almost at Once, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2004, at A1. 
 4. Steven F. Huefner, Assistant Professor of Law at Moritz College of Law of Ohio 
State University, attempted to raise awareness of the problem.  See Withstanding election 
day Terrorism, at http://www.moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/elections_pres02.html (last 
visited May 29, 2005). 
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attack would have on presidential succession,5 there appears not to have 
been even a “white paper” published by Congress or any agency of the 
executive department of the United States government relating to the 
impact of an attack during or immediately preceding a presidential election.  
On one hand, this lack of planning is understandable: elections in the 
United States, even presidential elections, are held and regulated by states 
and municipalities.6  The federal government, aside from several roles 
mandated by the Constitution and a limited number of statutes, plays 
almost no role in conducting our nation’s elections.7  Thus, there is no 
standing agency that normally studies or regulates the administration of 
elections.8
This failure is especially appalling considering the response to the World 
Trade Center attack was to cancel the election in progress.  Not once in our 
nation’s history has a presidential election been canceled or postponed—for 
any reason, including during the civil war—but, somehow, the idea of 
ensuring that no enemy would prevent the disruption of the 2004 election 
was entertained for only a fleeting moment, but never implemented.
  On the other hand, it is unfathomable that after the September 
11 attacks—which occurred during a mayoral primary election in New 
York City—neither Congress nor the executive branch acted to safeguard 
regularly scheduled elections, including that of president. 
9
This Essay will explore the authority of the United States Congress to 
rectify this substantial hole in our nation’s constitutional system.  Given the 
state-driven regulation of American elections, I will first explore how 
  We 
may have dodged a bullet last year, but the problem has not disappeared. 
 
 5. See generally John C. Fortier & Norman J. Ornstein, If Terrorists Attacked Our 
Presidential Elections, 3 ELECTION L.J. 597 (2004); Christopher Lee, A Scenario Where 
Doubts Linger; Despite Plans, Some Doubt Government’s Ability to Provide Services in 
Emergency, WASH. POST, June 22, 2004, at A15. 
 6. See, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974).  “[T]he States have evolved 
comprehensive, and in many respects complex, election codes regulating in most substantial 
ways, with respect to both federal and state elections, the time, place, and manner of holding 
primary and general elections, the registration and qualifications of voters, and the selection 
and qualification of candidates.”  Id. 
 7. See Sandusky County Democratic Party v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 565, 568 (6th Cir. 
2004) (per curiam) (noting that the states are the primary regulators of federal, state, and 
local elections) (citing Storer, 415 U.S. at 730); see also Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 
29 (1968). 
 8. There are two notable exceptions: the Federal Election Commission polices 
campaign finance, see 2 U.S.C. § 437c (2005) (establishing the Federal Election 
Commission and granting it the power to regulate the financing of presidential election 
campaigns), and the Department of Justice monitors compliance with the Voting Rights Act, 
see 42 U.S.C. § 1973a (2005). 
 9. See generally Could November Election be Delayed?, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 12, 
2004, at 4 (reporting that U.S. Homeland Security Officials were considering ways to delay 
the election in the event of a terrorist attack). 
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various states and municipalities have responded to extraordinary 
circumstances on or immediately before an election.  This has occurred 
infrequently, but often enough to reveal that state law is woefully 
ambiguous as to how governmental agencies or elected officials may 
respond to such emergencies.  Because I am predominantly concerned 
about presidential elections, I will also look at how federal law affects this 
“doomsday scenario.”  Finally, I will recommend what the United States 
Congress can—and should—do. 
 
I.  SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 
The nature of the problem becomes apparent by examining the 
governmental response to the extraordinary attack on September 11.  It was 
Primary Election Day across New York State, including a Democratic party 
primary for mayor of the City of New York, other city-wide and borough-
wide offices, and fifty-one City Council seats.  The polls opened at 6 a.m., 
and were scheduled to remain open until 9 p.m.  The attack, which began at 
8:46 a.m. and ultimately destroyed the Twin Towers, rendered several 
polling places located near the World Trade Center dangerous and 
inaccessible.  Amidst the unprecedented turmoil that grew throughout the 
city that horrific morning, decisions about the pending election had to be 
made. 
At about 9:15 a.m., the Executive Director of the New York City Board 
of Elections attempted to reach Governor Pataki, but could not locate 
him.10  In the meantime, the Board of Elections counsel contacted New 
York Supreme Court Justice Steven Fisher, who had been appointed 
several weeks earlier by the state’s Office of Court Administration to 
supervise the 2001 New York City elections.  Judge Fisher issued an Order 
canceling the election.11
 
 10. As campaign counsel to Mark Green, a leading candidate (and eventual Democratic 
party nominee) for Mayor in the September 11 primary election, the author, upon learning 
that the second Tower was hit, called the Executive Director of the New York City Board of 
Elections, Daniel De Francesco. Mr. De Francesco advised the author that he had earlier 
placed a call to the Governor’s office, but was told that the Governor’s whereabouts were 
not known.  Telephone conversation with Daniel De Francesco, Executive Director, New 
York City Board of Elections (Sept. 11, 2001). 
  Eventually, the Governor was found, and he then 
 11. See Joel Siegel, Mayoral Primary’s Not Even Secondary: Elections Indefinitely 
Postponed, DAILY NEWS (New York), Sept. 12, 2001, at 59.  Counsel for the four candidates 
competing in the Democratic party primary election for mayor, including the author, as well 
as representatives of good-government groups, and the bi-partisan New York City Board of 
Elections, had been meeting regularly for approximately six months prior to the September 
11 primary.  The goal was to avoid, or at least minimize, the kinds of procedural 
irregularities that occurred during the previous year’s presidential election.  This 
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issued an Executive Order suspending the election in light of the obvious 
emergency.12
Whether Justice Fisher had the authority to cancel the municipal 
elections is open to question, but no one challenged his order on that day or 
afterward.  He defended his action on the ground that the polling places 
were no longer fully staffed by Board of Elections personnel and police, as 
required by law.
 
13  Thus, as a result of police abandoning their election 
posts for the World Trade Center, procedural safeguards for the election 
disappeared.14
Whether the Governor could simply have issued an Executive Order 
canceling the election is also uncertain.  Ignoring the specific provision of 
the election law that addressed postponing a vote during a disaster,
 
15 
Governor Pataki relied upon plenary powers to temporarily suspend the 
election.16  He halted primaries statewide, although the disruption was 
centered in New York City and there was no evidence that voting could not 
proceed in the rest of the state.17
Despite the lack of clarity provided by New York law and the 
questionable legality of the executive and judicial responses to the election 
crisis caused by the attack, the New York legislature, like the United States 
Congress, has not enacted any statutory protections in anticipation of future 
attacks.  Put another way, although the trauma was probably the single 
most important reason that normally litigious New York election lawyers 
did not challenge the Governor’s wholesale cancellation of the election 
throughout the state, these scarring events did not sufficiently command the 
  In the aftermath of the attacks, the 
Governor’s action was, like Justice Fisher’s, officially unchallenged. 
 
extraordinarily cooperative effort resulted in an agreement whereby the New York State 
Office of Court Administration, the body that administers the judiciary in the state, would 
appoint a judge to directly supervise election issues in order to resolve procedural 
difficulties expeditiously.  Supreme Court Justice Steven Fisher was so appointed.  See 
Siegel, supra. 
 12. N.Y. COMP. R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 5.113 (2001). 
 13. Dahlia Lithwick, How Do You Cancel an Election?, SLATE, Sept. 12, 2001, at 
http://slate.msn.com/id/1008278 (last visited May 29, 2005). 
 14. See id. 
 15. The election law states that such a postponement is to be determined by a county or 
state board of elections.  N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 3-108 (McKinney 2005). 
 16. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 29-a (McKinney 2005).  “[T]he governor may by executive 
order temporarily suspend specific provisions of any statute, local law, [or] ordinance . . .  
during a state disaster emergency if compliance with such provisions would prevent, hinder 
or delay action necessary to cope with the disaster.”  Id. 
 17. Adam Nagourney, A Day of Terror: The Elections; Pataki Orders Postponement of 
Primaries Across State, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at A8.  “Primaries were being held in 
most of the 62 counties in New York . . . .”  Id. 
GOLDFEDERCHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:03 PM 
2005] TERRORISM AND ELECTIONS  105 
attention of New York public officials to enact more suitable legislation.18
Consequently, were another extraordinary event to prompt cancellation 
of an election in New York State, there would still be absolutely no 
statutory guidance as to the practical questions that might ensue.  For 
instance, could a mayor or town supervisor act on his own to call off a local 
election without the blessing of the governor?  Would votes already cast 
before disaster struck be counted, or would those voters be allowed to vote 
on the postponed election day?
 
19  Does either the New York State Board of 
Elections or the New York City Campaign Finance Board, the 
governmental agency that regulates public matching funds for New York 
City municipal candidates, have the authority to alter contribution and 
expenditure limits as a result of an unanticipated expanded election 
season?20  If some voting records were destroyed, would “same-day 
registration” be permitted so that voters would not be disenfranchised?21
 
 
II.  HOW STATES HAVE ADDRESSED THE PROBLEM 
Although states are the primary regulators of elections, they have not 
been diligent in enacting appropriate prophylactic statutes for emergency 
situations.  The emergency need not be a terrorist attack; after all, there 
have been floods, snowstorms, hurricanes, and electrical outages that have 
crippled cities from time to time.  Several of the largest states—California, 
 
 18. Jill Gardiner, Extra Security Likely at Polls, N.Y. SUN, Nov. 2, 2004, at 1.  After 
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), it is not clear whether New York retains the “dubious 
distinction of generating half the country’s election litigation.”  Gardiner, supra. 
 19. The votes cast on the morning of September 11 were nullified.  Those voters were 
able to cast another ballot at the postponed election two weeks later.  This decision was 
announced on September 13, 2001 by Governor Pataki and the state’s legislative leaders.  
Their press release stated, inter alia: 
Under the legislation agreed to by the Governor and the Legislature, the new 
primary elections will take place on September 25, 2001.  Any votes cast on 
September 11th will not be counted, but all absentee ballots duly and properly cast 
will continue to be valid and will be counted. 
Press Release, Office of the Governor of the State of New York, Governor, Legislature 
Announce New Primary Election Date (Sept. 13, 2001), available at 
http://www.state.ny.us/governor/press/year01/sept13_4_01.htm. 
 20. The New York City Campaign Finance Board, which oversees municipal candidates 
who have “opted in” to the public matching funds program, decided, from its makeshift 
office after its regular downtown quarters were rendered unusable by the Trade Center 
attack, that no candidate could spend any money on campaigning from September 11 to the 
new primary day, two weeks later. New York City Campaign Finance Board Advisory 
Opinion 2001-12 (Sept. 20, 2001). 
 21. See Fortier and Ornstein, Ballot Box Needs Some Backup Against Terrorism, L.A. 
TIMES, Mar. 29, 2004, at B11. 
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Texas, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Michigan for example—have no election 
emergency statutes, but rather general “state of emergency” provisions, 
similar to the one invoked by the Governor in New York in September 
2001, allowing him to suspend New York law.22
But plenary executive powers do not provide the kind of guidance 
necessary to decide when or how to postpone an election.  For instance, 
should there be a rule (or a rule of thumb) to call off an election when an 
attack occurs before election day?  How long before election day must the 
attack occur, and what kind of circumstances must occur to call it off?  
Must a certain percentage of polling sites become inoperative for an 
election to be canceled?  And, given the fact that many of the states’ 
election officials are partisan, and many elections for state or city executive 
positions are hotly contested, it is not an academic question as to who 
should make these decisions. 
 
If an attack or disaster occurs on election day, as occurred on September 
11 in New York, may those who have already voted either in person or by 
mail be permitted to cast another vote on the new election day?  After all, if 
there is an attack, there is no question that the dynamic and important 
issues of the campaign will have been dramatically altered.23
If there is an attack in one part of a jurisdiction, say New York City, and 
there is a statewide election, why should voters in an unaffected area, such 
as Buffalo, be prevented from casting their ballots after the attack?  And, in 
this example, if there is a statewide election and  the election is postponed 
in only part of the state, should the state or municipality ensure that the 
votes already cast remain uncanvassed until the resumed election is 
complete? 
  On the other 
hand, if a voter has chosen to mail in an absentee ballot, would it be fair to 
allow her to vote a second time?  Here, the voter makes the choice to vote 
in advance of election day, and even in ordinary elections, events often 
change the campaign dynamic in the last few days of a race.  Thus, why 
should someone who has chosen to vote early get a second chance? 
Furthermore, if an election is canceled, would the incumbent office-
holders retain their positions  beyond the constitutional or statutory 
terms?24
 
 22. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8571 (West 2005); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 3305/7 (2005); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 30.405 (2005); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7301(f)(1) (2005); TEX. GOV’T 
CODE ANN. § 418.016 (Vernon 2005).  Two states, Ohio and New Jersey, have no 
emergency protection legislation at all. 
  And, if so, under what authority? 
 23. See, e.g., Philip Lentz, Election Day Attack On NY Unmakes Mayor Green; Sept. 11 
Events Cast Giuliani as a Hero, Transfer His Aura to Free-Spending Mike, CRAIN’S N.Y. 
BUS., Mar. 4, 2002, at 9. 
 24. After September 11, the term-limited Mayor Rudolph Giuliani proposed that his 
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In short, there are serious questions for election lawyers, elected officials 
and the public to ponder.  Generalized emergency statutes offer no 
guidance, yet four years after the worst attack on our country, no state has 
any particularized procedures in place to address these practical and serious 
issues.  This is not to say that states have not been able to deal with 
extraordinary circumstances when the need has arisen.  Given the fact, 
however, that elections by their nature are often quite contentious, it is not 
surprising that in the few instances where an exercise of generalized 
powers has been invoked to postpone an election, there have been  
challenges to such actions in the courts. 
In the New York 2001 example, the authority to cancel the election 
statewide was dubious, but the magnitude and shock of the attack probably 
discouraged anyone from challenging the Governor’s order.25
A.  Lewiston, Maine, 1952 
  Historically, 
this is anomalous.  During the past sixty years, there have been few 
instances of an election having been postponed, but such postponements 
brought court challenges.  Reported cases of challenges to these actions 
demonstrate that courts applied flexible, pragmatic approaches, interpreting 
plenary statutory authority liberally and deferring to executive decision-
making in the face of extraordinary circumstances. 
In February, 1952, the City of Lewiston, Maine, pursuant to its city 
charter,26
 
second four-year term of office, set to expire on December 31, 2001, continue an additional 
three months.  Democratic front-runner Mark Green supported the idea; Fernando Ferrer, his 
opponent in the Democratic primary run-off election, opposed it.  As a result, Green’s 
previous strong support among white liberals who had fought Giuliani’s policies during the 
previous eight years withered, permitting Green to only squeak out a victory over Ferrer.  
See id. 
 scheduled an election on the third Monday of the month for the 
offices of Mayor and members of the Board of Alderman.  No election was 
held on that day, February 18, however, because the city was experiencing 
 25. As mayoral candidate Mark Green’s campaign lawyer, the author was familiar with 
the major actors in that election. To his knowledge, no effort was made to challenge the 
postponement of the primary election from September 11 to September 25.  On the contrary, 
the postponement developed from a general consensus: in the afternoon and evening of the 
day of the attack, and during the next day or so, government officials, Board of Election 
personnel, and campaign personnel discussed how to reschedule the primary.  Initial talks 
focused on a two-day postponement.  Ultimately, considering the extent of the damage, the 
deep shock in the city, and the intervening Jewish High Holy Days, a two-week 
postponement was accepted by all players as reasonable.  Not surprisingly, this consensus 
was reached rather quickly.   
 26. Art. II, § 1 of Chap. 8 of the Private and Special Laws of Maine 1939, amended by 
Ch. 86 of Private and Special Laws 1943.  
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the “most severe blizzard in a period of sixty years.”27
and had so increased in severity by 8 a.m. on  February 18, when the polls 
were to be opened, that all of the walks, streets and ways in the city were 
not passable by pedestrian or vehicle.  Access to the polling places was 
impossible because of the storm.  Wardens and ward clerks for most of 
the polling places were unable to report for duty at any time during the 
voting period between 8 a.m. and 7 p.m.  The continued efforts of the city 
clerk during the day to obtain the presence of legal voters in most of the 
polling places . . . met with little success because voters were unable to 
get to the polling places.  The city clerk himself found it impossible to 
deliver ballots to polling places.  All transportation utilities throughout the 
city were unable to operate.  Approximately three feet of snow, with drifts 
of greater depth, made industry, business, schools, and the opening of 
State, County, and Town offices impossible for the day. . . .  By reason of 
this “snow-bound” condition that existed during all of February 18, 1952, 
no votes were cast at any polling place, although the number of registered 
voters in the city was 21,252.  No election was, or could be, held because 
of the unprecedented storm.
  The storm started 
the day before 
28
As a result, “municipal officers” of Lewiston called off the February 18 
election—which, of course, had been effectively “nullified” by mother 
nature—and then gave notice for a re-scheduled election one week later, on 
February 25, 1952.
 
29
The re-scheduled election was held, and 13,100 votes were cast.
 
30  No 
mayoral candidate received a majority, thus requiring, pursuant to the city 
charter, a run-off election on the first Monday in March.31  Accordingly, on 
March 3, Roland L. Marcotte was elected mayor, and on March 17, he and 
the duly elected Aldermen were sworn in and took office.32
On behalf of the State of Maine, Attorney General Alexander A. LeFleur 
commenced an action in quo warranto, questioning Mayor Marcotte and 
his colleagues’ authority to act as city officials on the ground that the 
 
 
 27. State v. Marcotte, 89 A.2d 308, 309 (Me. 1952). 
 28. Id.  
 29. Id.  The court did not identify the “municipal officers” who made the decision to 
postpone the election and it is not clear that the same decision would have been made if fifty 
or one hundred voters had made it to the polls.  Presumably, because the blizzard brought 
the city to a near stand-still, a few votes would not have made a difference.  In that case, 
however, the court would have had to grapple with the issue of how to handle the votes that 
had been cast. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
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February 25 election was invalid.33
The Marcotte court reasoned that, absent “fault, mistake, carelessness, 
fraud, or design” to prevent the originally scheduled election, it would read 
the provision in the City Charter designating the third Monday in February 
as election day as “directory” rather than mandatory.
  Apparently having original jurisdiction 
in the matter, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine dismissed the claim by 
the Attorney General, holding that the election was properly canceled  and 
re-scheduled.  Thus, the results of the re-scheduled elections were lawful, 
and the successful candidates could assume their respective public offices. 
34  The court noted 
that the 1952 storm was “of such unusual proportions and such unexpected 
violence that it might well be considered that there was no election due to 
‘an act of God.’”35  Furthermore, there was neither constitutional nor 
statutory prohibition of a rescheduled election.36  Thus, an election could 
be canceled in the event of an “unavoidable circumstance” such as the 
blizzard experienced by the people of Lewiston, and a new election day 
could be scheduled,37 making the postponed election for mayor and 
Aldermen of the city of Lewiston valid.38
 
 33. Id. at 308.  Quo warranto proceedings are now abolished in Maine.  See Lund ex rel. 
Wilbur v. Pratt, 308 A.2d 554, 558 n.1 (Me. 1973). 
 
 34. See Marcotte, 89 A.2d at 311-12.  There is support for this holding in the case law of 
other states.  See generally State ex rel. Sisson v. Felkner, 336 S.W.2d 419, 421-22 (Mo. 
1960) (holding that although time and place are generally considered “of the substance of an 
election,” many statutory provisions pertaining to such matters have been expressly held to 
be or treated as “directory,” at least “where the person or body charged with the duty of 
calling or holding the election has failed or refused to do so”); Rainwater v. State ex rel. 
Strickland, 187 So. 484 (Ala. 1939).  Rainwater is often cited authoritatively for the 
proposition that even “fixed” election dates are “directory,” permitting officials to postpone 
voting under certain circumstances: 
While it must be conceded that time, place and qualified electorate are the 
essential elements of a valid election, and that statutes specifying the date of 
holding an election are regarded ordinarily, as mandatory, nevertheless, we find 
many well considered authorities holding that statutes providing for periodical 
elections in municipalities are merely directory. 
Rainwater, 187 So. at 486. 
 35. Id. at 312.; see also 6 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 319 (2004) (describing the 
standards that a casualty or phenomenon must reach to qualify as an act of God). 
 36. Id.  
 37. Marcotte, 89 A.2d at 311. 
 38. Interestingly, the Attorney General, who brought the quo warranto proceeding, 
argued to the court that the municipal officers had no authority to reschedule the Lewiston 
election.  See Marcotte, 89 A.2d at 311.  He conceded, however, that a court of competent 
jurisdiction “might have compelled the officers to call a later election.”  Id.  The court 
rejected this argument, stating that, “It seems somewhat inconsistent that where no election 
is held due to an excusable mistake, or by an unavoidable circumstance, that the date of a 
later election may only be fixed by the Court in mandamus, although the officials are 
willing to act.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
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B.  Washington County, Pennsylvania, 1985 
During the statewide election in Pennsylvania on November 5, 1985, 
rainy weather caused flooding along the Monongahela River in Washington 
County.39  The county’s election commissioners declared a state of 
emergency, and the governor proclaimed Washington County a disaster 
area.40  At the request of the election board, the county’s specially 
designated election judge, President Judge Gladden, suspended the election 
without conducting a hearing.41  As a result of Judge Gladden’s order, polls 
were closed in eleven election precincts “because of a state of ‘emergency’ 
created by extreme weather conditions that caused extensive flooding, loss 
of electricity, heat and water.”42  The election in these eleven precincts was 
re-scheduled for two weeks later.43  A notice was sent out, but it did not 
“list the names of candidates vying for the various offices and failed to 
include the office of county controller as an office being contested.”44
After the election, Patricia Beharry, the victorious controller, sought to 
reverse the orders of the election judge despite its lack of affect on her 
successful candidacy.
 
45  Ms. Beharry claimed, inter alia, that the Court of 
Common Pleas did not have authority to suspend the election in 
Washington County’s eleven precincts; that doing so violated federal and 
state constitutional due process protections; and, in failing to specify the 
offices being contested, that the court violated the publication requirements 
for special elections.46  The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania rejected 
these claims.47
The court noted that neither the Pennsylvania Constitution nor the state’s 
election code “expressly provides any procedure to follow when a natural 
disaster creates an emergency situation that interferes with an election.”
 
48
 
 39. See In re General Election—1985, 531 A.2d 836, 838 (Pa. 1987). 
  
 40. Id. 
 41. In Pennsylvania, state law provides that each county has assigned to it an “Election 
Judge” for the purpose of administering the election and resolving issues that come before 
it.  25 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3046 (2004). 
 42. General Election, 89 A.2d at 838.  Election judges in nearby counties chose not to 
close the polls assigned to them, casting doubt on the severity of the emergency.  Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 839. 
 45. See id. at 838 (holding that the controller had standing to sue despite her victory, 
which was unaffected by the rescheduled election date). 
 46. See id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
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The court was satisfied, however, that the state Election Code provided the 
election judge with authority to reschedule elections when “members of the 
electorate could be deprived of their opportunity to participate because of 
circumstances beyond their control, such as a natural disaster, and this 
would be inconsistent with the purpose of the election laws.”49
The court further said that it would have been more desirable if the 
notices announcing the rescheduled election day had listed the names of 
candidates vying for the various positions, but held that this was not a 
“special election” under the code, and, therefore, the notice was not 
required to contain this information.
 
50  Petitioner’s due process arguments 
were also rejected on the grounds that, “[w]ithout the court’s action, some 
voters, by reason of the elements, would have incurred the discrimination 
of disenfranchisement.”51
Finally, the court dismissed petitioner’s contention that the election 
judge “should have voided the entire county election and ordered the 
holding of an entirely new election countywide.”
 
52
 
 49. Id. (citing 25 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3046 (2004), stating that on election day, “the court 
of common pleas of each county or a judge thereof” could make decisions about “matters 
pertaining to the election as may be necessary to carry out the intent of this act.”). 
  This argument, 
although unsuccessful in the Pennsylvania case, raises two issues of general 
importance—one relating to voter eligibility, the other to canvassing.  First, 
if voting must be postponed in some precincts, should voters in all 
precincts be able to cast their ballots on the postponed election day, even 
those who had already voted?  If they are not permitted to vote again, is it 
fair to say that they have been disenfranchised in an election whose issues 
might be different than when they had originally cast their ballots? On the 
other hand, if they can vote on the postponed date, are not they given an 
unfair opportunity to vote twice?  Second, if those who have already voted 
may not vote on the new election day, should election officials canvass the 
votes already cast prior to the postponed election day?  If votes in 
unaffected areas are canvassed,  might not those partial results affect the 
subsequent turnout and balloting in precincts where the voting had been 
postponed?  The court did not address these exigencies, but it did limit the 
precedential effect of its decision, saying that “the remedy which the 
[lower] court applied in this case is not the proper one for all situations; . . 
.[but that] the court’s approach was a reasonable one in the circumstances 
 50. Id. (noting that special elections are held to fill vacancies in specific offices, which 
was not the case in this election). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. (holding that such a drastic remedy was not called for under the circumstances 
presented to the court). 
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of this case.”53
In the Maine and Pennsylvania cases, therefore, the  courts applied a 
flexible, common sense approach.  Statutes that provided generalized 
powers to election officials were interpreted broadly, and the courts 
inferred good faith by the actors involved.  Because the suspension of 
voting and the subsequent rescheduling of election days did not appear to 
have any impact on the results of the elections, the courts had the luxury of 
rendering their respective decisions in the absence of outcome-
determinative litigation.  It is an obviously open question whether the 
Pennsylvania court’s analysis and ruling would have been the same if the 
votes from the eleven precincts in Washington County were dispositive in 
the county controller’s race.  This question underscores why the 
Pennsylvania court insisted that its holding be narrowly construed. 
 
Similarly, in Marcotte, the court was not presented with a claim that the 
election’s cancellation benefited or harmed any candidate; after all, the 
blizzard was overwhelming, total, and unambiguous.  A less devastating 
storm, affecting only parts of the city, might very well have raised a host of 
questions, such as the ones raised above.  Fortunately for the parties and the 
courts, however, those issues were not extant. 
C.  Maryland, 1988 
In January 1988, the Office of the Attorney General of the State of 
Maryland received an inquiry from Gene Raynor, the state administrator of 
elections, concerning the upcoming primary, scheduled for March 8, 1988.  
Raynor sought a formal opinion from the Attorney General “concerning the 
procedures to be followed by local boards of election in the event that 
severely inclement weather interferes with the operations of polling places 
on election day.”54  The request was prompted by the “concern of local 
election officials that a snow storm might cause havoc on March 8, the 
unusually early date set for this year’s primary election.”55
The Attorney General replied: 
 
Inclement weather ordinarily would not be a reason for any change in the 
conduct of the election.  Neither the State Administrative Board of 
Election Laws nor any local election board has the power to alter the date 
or times prescribed by law for an election, on grounds of bad weather or 
for any other reason.  However, if weather conditions were so severe that 
a substantial number of polling places in one or more jurisdiction [sic] 
 
 53. Id. at 840. 
 54. 73 Md. Op. Att’y Gen. 136 (1988). 
 55. Id. 
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could not open, the Governor has the power to declare a state of 
emergency and suspend the provision of the Election Code that mandates 
the conduct of the primary election on March 8.  Alternatively, a local 
election board might petition the circuit court of a county adversely 
affected by weather conditions to reschedule the election in that 
jurisdiction, but the court’s authority to take that action is uncertain.56
In reaching his conclusion, the Attorney General reviewed the state’s 
Election Code, the emergency powers of the governor, and the 
Pennsylvania flooding case, In re General Election—1985.
 
57  He noted that 
the Election Code prescribed the exact date and time in which the election 
should take place and found no provision in the Code that dealt expressly 
with the “adversities of inclement weather”58 or that allowed for any 
change of election day, although he cited circumstances where electrical 
storms caused temporary power outages, leading local election officials to 
arrange for emergency lighting.59
On the other hand, the Attorney General said that the governor had the 
power to proclaim a state of emergency and that, in such circumstances, he 
may “[s]uspend the provisions of any statute, or of any rule or regulation of 
any State or local agency.”
 
60  Thus, the governor “could suspend the 
provision of the Election Code mandating the March 8 primary date.”61  
Such postponement, however, would trigger a “duty to direct alternative 
arrangements in lieu of the suspended provision, in order to achieve the 
objective of the suspended statute.”62
Finally, the Attorney General advised that local boards of elections, 
rather than relying upon a governor who may or may not choose to exercise 
his or her general powers, might opt to seek relief directly from the courts.  
In providing a context for this possibility, he referenced In re General 
Election—1985, and distinguished Maryland’s election law from 
Pennsylvania’s, which, unlike the former, contains an express provision for 
judicial oversight of elections;
 
63
 
 56. Id. 
  Maryland’s law, however, did grant 
authority to the courts to redress acts or omissions relating to an election.  
Considering that provision, the Attorney General acknowledged the 
possibility that a court might have the power to postpone an election 
 57. Id. 
 58. See id. 
 59. See id. at n.1 (noting that voting machines do not operate electronically). 
 60. Id. (citation omitted). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
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because of adverse conditions, but stopped short of endorsing that 
interpretation.64
In issuing his Opinion, the Maryland Attorney General was being 
appropriately conservative in his interpretation of state law.  Perhaps he 
would have felt more comfortable about a court’s powers had State v. 
Marcotte been brought to his attention.
 
65
The Attorney General’s cautious response to the inquiry seems neither 
surprising nor inappropriate, considering the hypothetical question raised 
about the exercise of power in the face of emergency conditions.  That said, 
his view is additional evidence of the inherent problems when there is an 
absence of clearly articulated election procedures during extraordinary 
circumstances.  
 The Maine statutory code 
considered by the Marcotte court resembled Maryland’s—with its lack of 
an express judicial oversight provision—more than Pennsylvania’s. 
Nevertheless, as we have seen, the Marcotte court exercised its authority to 
review the postponement of an election during an emergency. 
III.  THE FEDERAL CONTEXT 
I have been addressing the limited circumstances where highly unusual 
exigencies have prompted a state or municipality to cancel an election and 
reschedule it for a later time.  Considering their infrequency, the 
opportunities for judicial gloss on the actions taken have been scarce. The 
analysis employed, and the lessons to be drawn in the context of a federal 
election, however, are somewhat different than we have seen in state or 
municipal elections.  Yet, the central point of the relevant history and 
jurisprudence is the same: just as a state or municipal election date has been 
found to be directory rather than mandatory, a federal election’s date is 
similarly not constitutionally fixed or incapable of being altered under 
certain conditions.  The significance of this, of course, is that the United 
States Congress can, if the need arises, postpone federal election day. 
A. Historical Perspective 
Until the 1840s, the states conducted federal elections pursuant to their 
own regulations.66
 
 64. See id. 
  In the early days of the republic, some states appointed 
 65. Given the text of his opinion, it is fair to infer that State v. Marcotte was not brought 
to his attention. 
 66. See Voting Integrity Project v. Keisling, 259 F.3d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 2001): 
Until the 1840s, Congress left the actual conduct of federal elections to the 
diversity of state arrangements.  In 1845, Congress provided that in presidential 
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presidential electors by popular vote and others did so through legislative 
action, and did so at different times.67  The various methods employed by 
the states obviously played a role in the campaigns undertaken by 
candidates for president.68
These practices were reformed by Congress in 1845, when the day for 
election of presidential electors was also standardized,
  Likewise, candidates for the House of 
Representative were voted upon at different times in the several states, 
sometimes in different months. 
69 and again in 1872, 
when the day for election of members of the House of Representative was 
made uniform.70  Congressional debate regarding these proposals reveals 
the importance of uniform election days.  During the 1844 debate on the 
election of the electoral college, Congress “considered and rejected the 
practice of multi-day voting [which was then] allowed by some states.”71  
In Virginia, for example, “‘it frequently happened that all the votes were 
not polled in one day.’”72  Advocates for reform strenuously argued that the 
“time must be uniform in the States” so as not replicate the “great frauds” 
that had allegedly occurred in the previous presidential election.73
Similarly, in the 1871-72 Congressional debates, multi-day voting was 
addressed explicitly, and rejected once again.  “[T]he anarchy and terrorism 
resulting from massive voting fraud in ‘Bleeding Kansas’ by pro-slavery 
voters from Missouri crossing the [Kansas] border to counter pro-abolition 
voters from New England”
 
74 was fresh in the minds of many in Congress.  
Thus, a strong push for a uniform election day for representatives came 
from a desire to prevent “throwing voters across from one [state] into the 
other.”75
 
election years “[t]he electors of President and Vice President shall be appointed, 
in each State, on the Tuesday next after the first Monday in November.”  Further 
changes for the election of Representatives, Senators, and the President and Vice 
President were legislated as part of Reconstruction in the 1870s. 
 
Id. 
 67. See RICHARD J. ELLIS, FOUNDING THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 118 (1999).  
Massachusetts, the extreme example, employed seven systems of selecting electors in the 
first ten presidential elections.  Id. 
 68. See JOHN FERLING, ADAMS VS. JEFFERSON: THE TUMULTUOUS ELECTION OF 1800, at 
156 (2004). 
 69. See generally 3 U.S.C. § 1 (2005). 
 70. See generally 2 U.S.C. § 7 (2005). 
 71. Voting Integrity Project v. Keisling, 259 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 72. Id. at 1172 n.27 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1844)). 
 73. Id. at 1172-73 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1844)). 
 74. Id. (quoting ALBERT D. RICHARDSON, BEYOND THE MISSISSIPPI: FROM THE GREAT 
RIVER TO THE GREAT OCEAN 41 (1967)). 
 75. Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 2d Sess. 112 (1871)). 
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On the other hand, “concern was expressed about the inconvenience of 
changing state constitutions and laws to accommodate a uniform national 
day.” 76  The difficult logistics of same-day voting provided added weight 
for its opponents, who claimed that  “‘[i]t is an impossibility for the voters 
to all get together on one day [because] they are remote from the polls.’”77
 
  
Despite the critics, same day voting won out, with no accommodations to 
states then employing the practice of multiple-day voting. 
B.  The Louisiana Open Primary 
One hundred years after Congress required all states to vote for members 
of Congress on the same day, Louisiana created an “open primary” for 
Congressional elections.  In the month of October, all candidates—
regardless of party—would appear on a single ballot, and all voters would 
vote.  If a candidate received a majority of the vote, that person won the 
congressional seat and there would be no vote held in November.78  If no 
candidate received a majority, the top two vote-getters would take part in a 
run-off in November, on “federal election day.”79
A group of Louisiana voters challenged the procedure in federal court.  
After a dismissal at the district court level, the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit reversed, finding the relevant election law unconstitutional.  
The United States Supreme Court affirmed.
 
80  The issue before the Court in 
Foster was whether the Louisiana election scheme complied with the 
federal statute mandating a uniform election day for the election of 
Representatives to Congress and United States Senators.  Pursuant to the 
Elections Clause of the United States Constitution, “[t]he Times, Places 
and Manner of holding Elections for Senator and Representatives, shall be 
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at 
any time by Law make or alter such Regulations.”81  Thus, the Elections 
Clause “is a default provision; it invests the States with responsibility for 
the mechanics of congressional elections, but only so far as Congress 
declines to preempt state legislative choices.”82
 
 76. Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 2d Sess. 138-39 (1871)). 
  As noted above, Congress 
had in fact acted, and set the date of the biennial election as the Tuesday 
 77. Id. at 1174 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 2d Sess. 3408 (1872)). 
 78. See Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67 (1997). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. 
 82. Foster, 522 U.S. at 69 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
GOLDFEDERCHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:03 PM 
2005] TERRORISM AND ELECTIONS  117 
after the first Monday in November.83
The issue raised in Foster was not purely an academic matter: from 
1978, when Louisiana’s October open primary law went into effect, until 
the statute was challenged in Foster  almost twenty years later, a run-off 
election had been held on federal election day in only nine of the fifty-
seven contested elections for United States Representative and in only one 
Senate race.
 
84  Considering the meaning of “election,” the Court ruled that 
a contested election of candidates that is “concluded as a matter of law 
before the federal election day, with no act in law or in fact to take place on 
the date chosen by Congress” clearly violated 2 U.S.C. § 7.85  Although the 
Court rendered its decision based upon its reading of the plain meaning of 
the statute, it added that its “judgment [was] buttressed by an appreciation 
of Congress’s object ‘to remedy more than one evil arising from the 
election of members of Congress occurring at different times in the 
different States.’”86
As the sponsor of the original bill put it, Congress was concerned both 
with the distortion of the voting process threatened when the results of an 
early federal election in one State can influence later voting in other 
States, and with the burden on citizens forced to turn out on two different 
election days to make final selections of [members of Congress and 
President of the United States] . . . .
  The Court noted: 
87
 
 
Thus, according to Foster, an election to the United States Congress and 
the United States Senate was required to be held on federal election day.  
The election could not be concluded prior to that day. 
C.  What About Absentee Ballots and Early Voting? 
 Although Foster prohibits the conclusion of federal elections prior 
to election day, commencing such elections before the first Tuesday after 
the first Monday in November is a different matter.  For over a century, 
various states have permitted voting prior to election day through the use of 
absentee voting; today, all states provide some form of this.88
 
 83. 2 U.S.C. §§ 1, 7 (2005). 
  Congress 
 84. Foster, 522 U.S. at 70 n.1. 
 85. Id. at 67-68 (emphasis added).  The Court distinguished the Louisiana law from a 
situation where there is a “failure to elect” a Representative on election day because no 
candidate received a majority, thus triggering 2 U.S.C. § 8.  Id. 
 86. Id. at 73 (quoting Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 661 (1884)). 
 87. Id. 
 88. See generally Voting Integrity Project v. Bomer, 199 F.3d 773 (5th Cir. 2001). 
“More than a century ago, some states began to allow absentee voting, and all states 
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itself has authorized such early voting,89 looks upon the practice of early 
voting by absentee ballots “with favor,”90 and has “required absentee 
voting [to be allowed] in certain circumstances.”91
States have also enacted “early voting” statutes that permit voters to visit 
polling places before election day.  Despite their similarity to state and 
federal laws permitting or requiring absentee balloting, early voting 
practices met initial challenges.  A Texas early voting law granting voters 
an unrestricted right to vote up to seventeen days early survived review by 
the Fifth Circuit.
 
92  The court held that as long as Congressional elections 
are “consummated” on the statutorily-imposed federal election day, then 
early voting is permissible because “‘election’ meant ‘the combined actions 
of voters and officials mean to make a final selection of an office holder[;]’ 
[a]llowing some voters to cast votes before election day does not 
contravene the federal election statutes because the final selection is not 
made before the federal election day.” 93
The court identified several important considerations.  First, while Texas 
allowed early voting, the polls were open on federal election day and no 
election results were released until the votes were tabulated.
 
94  Second, the 
court noted parallels to the universal use of absentee voting by the states 
that permit voters to cast ballots prior to federal election day but does not 
hasten the conclusion of the election.95  Third, the court underscored the 
importance of protecting voting rights, and noted that it could not 
“conceive that Congress intended the federal election day statutes to have 
the effect of impeding citizens in exercising their right to vote.”96
 
currently provide for it in some form.”  Id. at 776 (citing Edward B. Moreton, Jr., Voting by 
Mail, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1261-62 (1985)); see also Griffin v. Roupas, 385 F.3d 1128, 
1131 (7th Cir. 2004).  That court reviewed states’ absentee balloting procedures and noted 
that some states found “that the drawbacks of absentee voting are so far outweighed by the 
interest in increasing voter turnout that every registered voter should be allowed to vote by 
absentee ballot.”  Id.  Oregon has gone the farthest, making all voting by mail; other states 
balance concerns about fraud and turnout by permitting limited classes of voters to cast 
absentee ballots.  Id. 
  Finally, 
the early voting statute did not promote the “primary evils” that Congress 
 89. Voting Integrity Project, 199 F.3d at 776 n.79. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 777 (emphasis in original) (noting that the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 
1970, the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, and other provisions 
require states to provide and accept absentee ballots from certain classes of voters). 
 92. Id. at 776. 
 93. Id. (quoting Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 71 (1997)). 
 94. Id. at 775-76.  In fact, the court noted, “Texas law makes it illegal for election 
officers to reveal any election results before the polls close on election day.”  Id. at 777. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
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sought to discourage by creating a federal election day: “‘distortion of the 
voting process [would be] threatened when the results of an early federal 
election in one state can influence later voting in other States, and . . . the 
burden on citizens forced to turn out on two different election days to make 
final selections of federal officers in presidential election years . . . .’”97
D.  After Federal Election Day 
  
Thus, like absentee balloting, early voting procedures were deemed 
permissible because the election is consummated on federal election day—
not before. 
As we have seen, therefore, courts developed a framework to analyze 
when and how voters may cast ballots prior to federal election day.  Under 
certain limited circumstances, courts also have permitted voting for federal 
officers after federal election day.  In Georgia, the 1980 redistricting plan 
required, pursuant to the Voting Rights Act, pre-clearance by the 
Department of Justice or approval by a federal District Court.98  Litigation 
over the redistricting plan resulted in a ruling that the proposed 
Congressional district lines violated Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.99  
As election day approached, a controversy developed over whether the 
elections should proceed as scheduled, based upon unlawful district 
lines.100  The court held that Georgia was not required to conduct 
congressional elections on these flawed lines in its fourth and fifth districts 
on November 2, 1982, the scheduled federal election day, and could hold 
the vote afterward.101  The court in Busbee construed the federal election 
statute “to mean that where exigent circumstances arising prior to or on the 
date established by [2 U.S.C. § 7] preclude holding an election on that date, 
a state may postpone the election until the earliest practicable date.”102
Cognizant of its extraordinary holding and the irregularity of the 
situation, the court took pains to address the State of Georgia’s objections.  
Georgia’s primary argument claimed the court lacked authority to postpone 
an election based on the district lines: federal law
 
103
 
 97. Id. (quoting Foster, 522 U.S. at 73). 
 permits elections on 
days other than federal election day if the office becomes vacant (upon the 
death of the officeholder, for instance) but does not authorize postponing a 
 98. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 5, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2005). 
 99. Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494 (1982). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 526. 
 102. Busbee, 549 F. Supp. at 525. 
 103. 2 U.S.C. § 8 (2005). 
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federal election to a later date.104  The State further argued that, because the 
Congressional seats would remain occupied until the officeholders’ terms 
expired on January 3, 1983 the statute created no authority to hold elections 
for those offices prior thereto.105
The court rejected the State’s arguments, holding that 2 U.S.C. § 8 
provided that, if there were a “failure to elect” a Member of Congress on 
election day, then the State could fix an alternative, later date for the 
election.  In doing so, the court acknowledged that although the statute’s 
drafters could not have foreseen “a ‘failure to elect’ engendered by a 
Section 5 injunction, interpreting that phrase as encompassing such a 
failure does no violence to Congress’ intent.”
 
106  Pointedly, the court added 
that “Congress did not expressly anticipate that a natural disaster might 
necessitate a postponement, yet no one would seriously contend that 
Section 7 would prevent a state from rescheduling its congressional 
elections under such circumstances.”107
Busbee was affirmed without opinion by the Supreme Court,
 
108 and 
stands for the proposition that a federal election may be postponed by a 
state under extraordinary circumstances.  Although the court did not define 
the parameters of such circumstances (besides illegal district lines), it left 
the door open for the same relief under other, unanticipated situations, such 
as a “natural disaster.”109  Notwithstanding the federal statute requiring 
federal elections to be held on a specified day,110
Eleven years later, the United States District Court of Georgia expanded 
this interpretation.  In Public Citizen, Inc. v. Miller,
 “no one would seriously 
contend” that “exigent circumstances” could prevent a state from 
postponing a scheduled election.  Despite its reference to natural disasters, 
Busbee, more importantly, demonstrates that postponement does not 
require a freak natural occurrence on or immediately preceding election 
day like those experienced by the voters of Lewiston, Maine and 
Washington County, Pennsylvania.  The Busbee court’s injunction relied 
on the principle that it is preferable to postpone an election than to hold an 
illegal one. 
111
 
 104. Busbee, 549 F. Supp. at 525. 
 the court, relying on 
Busbee, held that an election for the United States Senate that was 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 526. 
 107. Id. 
108. Busbee v. Smith, 459 U.S. 1166 (1983). 
 109. Id. 
 110. See 2 U.S.C. § 7 (2005). 
 111. Public Citizen, Inc. v. Miller, 992 F.2d 1548 (11th Cir. 1993). 
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inconclusive on the scheduled federal election day could be concluded 
three weeks later.  At the time, Georgia law required candidates to receive a 
majority of the votes cast.  In the absence of a majority, the state required a 
run-off election.  Supporters of the candidate who won an initial plurality, 
but lost in the run-off, commenced an action alleging that the run-off 
election, held three weeks after federal election day, was void because it 
contravened 2 U.S.C. § 7. 
The court held that because no candidate had won a majority of the votes 
cast on election day, the State of Georgia “fail[ed] to elect” a United States 
Senator, citing the Busbee court’s recognition that “federal law 
contemplates occasional departures from Section 7’s dictates.”112  The 
court noted that a state could not by design create the “exigent” 
circumstances required to circumvent the federal statute that requires same-
day voting for Congress,113  but that Georgia’s “majority vote” statute was 
not such an improper design.  “A plurality outcome in the general election 
[on election day] is similar to an election postponed due to natural disaster 
or voided due to fraud in that each is contemplated, yet beyond the state’s 
ability to produce.”114
Public Citizen, like Busbee, thus demonstrates a flexible approach to 
extending elections beyond the federal statutory date.  The decisions stand 
for the proposition that exigent circumstances, even if not unforeseen, 
allow a state, if not acting by design or fraud or in bad faith, to postpone or 
allow a subsequent conclusion of a federal election.  While the Supreme 
Court of the United States has not expressly written on the subject, its 
affirmance of Busbee adopts this as the law.  This approach is consistent 
with the few state cases described above where states have postponed local 
elections as a result of exigent circumstances. 
 
As with state or municipal elections, however, the federal context 
similarly offers no concrete guidelines as to what constitutes an exigent 
circumstance.  While leaving such determinations to the wisdom of public 
officials with oversight by the judiciary has apparently proved successful to 
date, it remains troublesome that federal election statutes, like state and 
local ones, are bereft of any required or suggested direction as to how to 
define “exigent” or “extraordinary” for the purpose of postponing an 
election.  Indeed, there are also no federal procedures relating to the 
implementation of postponed elections where some voters have already 
cast their ballots, where only part of the affected Congressional district or 
 
 112. Id. (quoting Busbee, 549 F. Supp. at 524-25). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
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state has been impacted by the disaster, or whether to canvass votes already 
cast in order to preserve their integrity.  In short, although certain 
circumstances permit legal postponements of federal elections, like their 
state or local counterparts, these situations are fraught with ambiguities and 
potential problems. 
IV. The Presidency 
Having reviewed how states may alter elections under extraordinary 
circumstances, albeit with dubious authority to do so and without anything 
approaching rigorous procedural protections, and having analyzed how 
federal statutes govern the alteration of congressional election days, I come 
to the question that prompted this inquiry.  In the face of a terrorist attack 
on the United States, can a scheduled presidential election be postponed, 
and, if so, by whom and by what authority? 
A devastating meteorological or other natural disaster is highly unlikely 
to impact the entire United States all at once.  The odds are even greater 
that this could happen on election day in a presidential election year—or a 
day or two before.  Unfortunately, the odds of a terrorist attack affecting a 
great part of the continental United States do not seem as unlikely.  Had the 
attack on September 11 been wholly successful, planes would have 
crippled lower Manhattan and much of Washington D.C., including the 
White House or Capitol Hill.115  Reports of Al Qaeda’s original plan for 
that attack called for ten planes to be hijacked and rammed into buildings in 
as many cities,116 certainly an event that could have crippled the United 
States.  Whatever successes there have been in the subsequent War on 
Terror, there is no doubt of the desire of certain elements to attempt future 
terrorist attacks against the United States.  Indeed, during the 2004 
presidential campaign, Republicans and Democrats alike warned that 
“another terrorist attack” was “inevitable.”117
It did not happen in 2004.  Can it happen in 2008?  In 2004, the Chair of 
the United States Election Assistance Commission wrote to the Department 
of Homeland Security discussing the idea of postponing the last 
presidential election in case there was a terrorist attack and pointing out 
that no agency or governmental body had authority to do so.
 
118
 
 115. Douglas Jehl & Daniel Johnston, Threats and Responses: The Hijackers, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 17, 2004, at A1. 
  Amidst the 
resulting hue and cry, its attempt to prepare a plan even for this remote 
 116. Id. 
 117. Calvin Sims, Poll Finds Most Americans Have Not Prepared for a Terrorist Attack, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2004, at A19. 
 118. See Could November Election be Delayed?, supra note 9. 
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exigency was apparently shelved,119
Perhaps the outcry against even proposing a plan in case the unthinkable 
occurred was because Americans did not want to consider this as the 
election approached.  Couple that with an abiding distrust of a President 
who ascended to the office through the Supreme Court’s Order stopping the 
re-count in Florida,
 but the problem, although now out of 
sight, has not been eliminated. 
120 and it became undesirable to think about 
circumstances that might postpone the 2004 election.  Indeed, the House of 
Representatives, in a strongly worded Resolution, left no doubt about 
where it stood.121
The fact that Americans have reacted so negatively to a perfectly 
appropriate attempt at preparedness is certainly explainable.  But, 
especially after the terrorist attack in Madrid just a few days prior to its 
March 2004 national elections, this ostrich-like defiance is not acceptable.  
So what are our options?  And what are the existing constraints? 
  The defiant statement, which passed on July 24, 2004 by 
the overwhelming vote of 419-2, essentially warned potential terrorists of 
American resolve: nothing was going to prevent our regularly scheduled 
presidential elections from going forward. 
A.  The Electoral College System is State-Driven 
The United States Constitution and federal statutes grant the several 
states dominant decision-making authority in presidential elections.  This is 
consistent with and reflective of the primal political forces that shaped our 
republic.  The records of the Constitutional Convention reveal powerful 
tensions between what were already traditional state prerogatives and a 
nascent drive toward nationalism. 
Nowhere was this predilection for state-driven governance more telling 
than in the creation of two uniquely American institutions—the United 
States Senate and the electoral college.  The Founders grappled with the 
creation of a chief executive for several months.122  They were deeply 
divided as to whether there should be one person at the helm of the new 
country or perhaps three,123 as well as how long the executive’s term 
should be and whether the office should be term-limited.124
 
 119. It is not wholly clear that exigency preparation did indeed cease.  If the 
administration continued to think about and plan for an election day attack, the public was 
not apprised. 
  The thorniest 
 120. See generally Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 121. H.R. 728, 108th Cong. (2004). 
 122. See ELLIS, supra note 67, at 63-96. 
 123. See id. at 31-34. 
 124. See id. at 97-100. 
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issue they confronted, however, was how the executive should be selected.  
Should he be chosen by the governors of the various states, elected by 
Congress, or directly voted upon by the people?125
The idea of an “electoral college” was raised numerous times during the 
debates, only to be repeatedly defeated.
 
126  The college was originally 
envisioned as consisting of persons who were accomplished and respected, 
but the idea did not garner much support.127  Finally, after several hot 
summer months in Philadelphia, and after the Connecticut compromise 
resulted in the creation of a House of Representatives and Senate, the idea 
seemed to catch hold.128  Resistant to a direct election, and worried about 
the executive’s dependence on the Congress if it chose him, the Founders 
chose a third way—a “college” of electors whose number would neatly 
reflect the total of Congressmen and Senators, but to avoid legislative 
control, would not include members from either body.129
Indeed, if there were any doubt about the supremacy of the states in the 
presidential election process, it was put to rest by the Supreme Court 
decision in McPherson v. Blacker.
  The Convention 
ensured local control over the process by mandating that the states would 
decide who became members of the electoral college and how they were to 
be selected. 
130  In McPherson, the Court affirmed 
the Michigan Supreme Court’s dismissal of a challenge to that state’s 
procedure for choosing presidential electors.  Pursuant to 1891 Michigan 
legislation, presidential electors consisted of a combination of eleven 
“district” electors, chosen by the voters of their respective districts, as well 
as a “western district at-large” elector and an “eastern district at-large” 
elector, each chosen by the voters of designated districts in their part of the 
state.131  The scheme was challenged based upon the claim that presidential 
electors had to be elected on a general, statewide ticket.132
The Supreme Court held that the Constitution gives the states absolute 
authority to decide how presidential electors were to be chosen.
 
133
 
 125. See id. at 63-66. 
  The 
Court then gave a brief recounting of states’ various methods in several 
presidential elections, including direct selection by the state legislature 
 126. Id. at 112. 
 127. Id. at 78. 
 128. Id. at 69. 
 129. Id. at 64-65. 
 130. 146 U.S. 1 (1892). 
 131. Id. at 4-7. 
 132. Id. at 25. 
 133. Id. at 34. 
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(sometimes by concurrent ballot, other times in joint session); by popular 
vote on a general, state-wide ticket: by popular vote on a district-by-district 
basis; by popular vote on a mixed general ticket and district voting system; 
and by popular vote on a district-by-district election of electors, who, in 
turn, elected at-large electors.134  The Court noted that, although there had 
been efforts to amend the Constitution to require the various states to have 
a “uniform mode of choice,” none had succeeded.135
Furthermore, although the Court observed that the political system did 
not reflect the  Founders’ apparent desire to have presidential electors 
“exercise a reasonable independence and fair judgment in the selection of 
the chief executive” because electors “were [now] chosen simply to register 
the will of the appointing power in [support] of a particular candidate,”
  
136 
the MacPherson Court could find “no reason for holding that the power 
confided to the states by the constitution ha[d] ceased to exist because the 
operation of the system had not fully realized the hopes for those by whom 
it was created.”137
In short, the Supreme Court left no doubt whatsoever that, absent an 
amendment to the United States Constitution, the electoral college is, was, 
and always will be a state-driven system, despite its singularly unique 
function of electing a national leader. 
 
B. Shackled By Our History and Jurisprudence 
Given our state-driven election system, it is not surprising that even in 
the two presidential elections that can be fairly characterized as long, 
drawn-out constitutional crises, the outcomes, though rendered by national 
institutions, were determined by state law, thus reinforcing our republic’s 
powerful historical preference for avoiding a national approach to a 
presidential election crisis.  This was true in 1876, and again in 2000. 
1.  1876 and the Electoral Count Act 
The 1876 Tilden-Hayes election was an electoral college deadlock.  It 
was fairly clear that Democrat Samuel J. Tilden, Governor of New York, 
had a majority of the popular vote.138
 
 134. Id. at 33. 
  What was not clear was the winner 
 135. Id. at 34-35. 
 136. Id. at 36. 
 137. Id. 
 138. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, CENTENNIAL CRISIS: THE DISPUTED ELECTION OF 1876, at 
99 (2004). 
GOLDFEDERCHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:03 PM 
126 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. XXXII 
of the electoral vote.139  There were four states that held the balance of 
power: Florida, Louisiana, South Carolina, and Oregon.  In Florida, which 
reprised its pivotal role in presidential elections some 125 years later, about 
50,000 votes had been cast.140  Votes were reported by the various counties 
to a State Canvassing Board, and, on the “face of the returns,” Tilden led 
Republican Rutherford B. Hayes by “only 80-some votes.”141  The 
Canvassing Board, however, which had two Republicans and one 
Democrat, had the authority and “discretion to exclude returns that were 
‘irregular, false, or fraudulent.’”142  Exercising this discretion, sometimes 
unanimously and sometimes by a 2-1 vote along party lines, the 
Canvassing Board concluded that Hayes had won the state by forty-five 
votes.143
In Louisiana, Tilden appeared to have won the state by between 8000 
and 9000 votes.
 
144  The State Returning Board, which had the ultimate 
decision-making authority as to the victor, was “not one to inspire 
confidence in the Democrats.”145  The law required that the Returning 
Board have five members with both parties represented, but there was only 
one Democrat on the Board, and he resigned prior to the 1876 election.146  
The president of the Board had been Governor of Louisiana during 
Reconstruction, but had been removed as governor “for dishonesty.”147  He 
remained on the Returning Board, however, and his three Republican 
colleagues were likewise “not held in high regard by impartial 
observers.”148  After taking testimony during twelve public sessions, the 
Board “rejected more than 13,000 Democratic [ballots]” and only 2500 
Republican votes.149
South Carolina saw “illegal voting by both white Democrats and black 
Republicans.”
  Unsurprisingly, Hayes was declared the winner. 
150  The Board of Canvassers certified Hayes as the 
winner.151
 
 139. Id. at 98. 
  The courts held the members of the Board in contempt, fined 
 140. Id. at 104. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 104-05. 
 144. Id. at 106. 
 145. Id. at 107. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 108. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 109. 
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them, and locked them up in the county jail.152
It was accepted by both sides that the presidential electors pledged to 
Hayes had won in Oregon.
 Nevertheless, Hayes 
prevailed. 
153  One of the Republican electors, however, 
was not eligible to serve because he was a “fourth-class postmaster and 
received an annual salary of $268.”154  There was no disagreement about 
the postmaster’s ineligibility, but Democrats and Republicans differed on 
how to interpret the state law governing how vacancies were to be filled.  
Republicans urged that the remaining electors should choose a 
replacement.155  This, of course, would have resulted in another Republican 
elector.  Democrats, on the other hand, argued that the candidate for elector 
with the next highest vote total should be elected.156
Needless to say, each presidential candidate needed every vote he could 
get.  With respect to Florida and Louisiana, “the Democrats could 
forcefully argue that a large part of the public thought that Tilden had 
carried both of the states, and he should not lose them both on what fairly 
might be thought to be the actions of politically biased Republican 
returning boards.”
  This interpretation 
would have led to another vote for Tilden. 
157  In Oregon, however, the Democratic position was 
“clearly contrary to state law.”158  Thus, both sides were “playing a no-
holds-barred game.”159
While the House of Representatives certainly could have constitutionally 
elected the president because no candidate appeared to have won an 
electoral college majority,
  Although each party was exploiting these states’ 
laws to its own advantage, the Republicans were more effective in 
controlling the election machinery, and thus were able to deliver their 
electoral votes to  their standard-bearer, Rutherford B. Hayes. 
160
 
 152. Id. 
 the prevailing uncertainty of the results in 
these four states, the almost certain existence of voting fraud, and the 
presence of violence on the streets by angry partisans, contributed to a very 
unstable political situation.  Thus, members of Congress were apparently 
reluctant to exercise their constitutional prerogative to elect a president as 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 110; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (prohibiting any “person holding an 
office of trust or profit under the United States” from serving as a presidential elector). 
 155. REHNQUIST, supra note 140, at 110. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 112. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
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their forebears had done in earlier  times.161  Consequently, they created an 
ad hoc solution, which acted as a buffer to shield them from a decision that 
was bound to be unpopular: a special Electoral Commission comprising of 
five congressional Democrats, five congressional Republicans, and five 
Supreme Court Justices.162  Ultimately, this Commission rendered a 
decision, which Congress ratified: Hayes was elected, and pledged to serve 
only one term (he was mocked throughout his tenure as “Rutherfraud” 
Hayes).  Tilden conceded and the republic’s business went forward.163
As a result of this presidential crisis, however, Congress enacted the 
Electoral Count Act, which codified a variety of procedures and deadlines 
to deal with the kind of uncertainty that existed in 1876 and avoid another 
ad hoc solution.  One of the reforms is the “Safe Harbor Provision” found 
in 3 U.S.C. § 5:
  
Succession in the presidency was uninterrupted, and political stability of a 
sort existed. 
164 
If any State shall have provided, by laws enacted prior to the day fixed for the 
appointment of the electors, for its final determination of any controversy or 
contest concerning the appointment of all or any of the electors of such State, 
by judicial or other methods or procedures, and such determination shall have 
been made at least six days before the time fixed for the meeting of the 
electors, such determination made pursuant to such law so existing on said 
day, and made at least six days prior to said time of meeting of the electors, 
shall be conclusive, and shall govern in the counting of the electoral votes as 
provided in the Constitution, and as hereinafter regulated, so far as the 
ascertainment of the electors appointed by such State is concerned.
This provision essentially directs states to establish laws and procedures to 
determine controversies and contests relating to the casting and counting of 
votes for presidential electors.  So long as the state follows its procedures 
in a timely manner, the statute renders the state’s judicial or regulatory 
determination of the outcome dispositive, and not subject to further 
 
 
 
 161. The last time the House determined the outcome of a presidential election was in 
1824 when John Quincy Adams defeated Andrew Jackson.  See ELLIS, supra note 67, at 
115. 
 162. See REHNQUIST, supra note 140, at 5. 
 163. Several months after the Commission selected Hayes as president, Governor Tilden 
was addressing a group of supporters at a political gathering in New York City.  Responding 
to their obvious upset at the results of the election, and the calls in some quarters for resort 
to arms, Tilden sought to reassure them: “If my voice could reach throughout our country 
and be heard in its remotest hamlet, I would say: Be of good cheer.  The Republic will live.  
The institutions of our fathers are not to expire in shame.”  Id. at 210 (quoting ALEXANDER 
CLARENCE FLICK, SAMUEL JONES TILDEN 412 (1963)). 
164. (2005). 
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challenge by Congress.  Thus, if the state meets the deadline, its slate of 
electors reside in a “safe harbor,” untouchable by those counting the 
electoral votes, the Congress. 
While this might appear to be couched in terms of Congressional power 
with regard to the counting of electoral votes, it actually reinforces the 
dominance of the states—they would dispose of vote challenges according 
to their own laws, and, if done by a certain date, Congress’s role in 
counting the electoral votes would be essentially ministerial.  Indeed, even 
if the dispute occurs in a state whose electoral votes will determine the 
overall outcome of the election, if the state resolves the controversy 
according to laws put in place prior to federal election day, that decision is 
final, and Congress is off the hook. 
Similarly, if there are competing slates of electors, the Electoral Count 
Act provides for a state-driven solution.165  While Congress resolves 
controversies as to which slate represents the state’s electoral votes, the 
decision is made based upon the laws of the state in question.166
But it gets better.  If both houses of Congress do not agree on how to 
interpret state law when deciding between or among competing slates of 
electors, then Congress simply looks to the governor of that state:  “
  There is 
no federal standard controlling how electors are elected (presuming, of 
course, that they are actually elected), or how the votes electing them are to 
be cast or counted.  So even if the Reform Act had been in effect in 1876, 
Congress would have done what the Commission did—analyze the vote 
totals pursuant to the state laws of Louisiana, Florida, South Carolina, and 
Oregon, each of which was different. 
[I]f the 
two Houses shall disagree in respect of the counting of such votes, then, 
and in that case, the votes of the electors whose appointment shall have 
been certified by the executive of the State, under the seal thereof, shall be 
counted.”167
Thus, the federal statute governing presidential elections, enacted on the 
heels of the 1876 presidential imbroglio and meant to avoid another Tilden-
Hayes situation, was, despite the corrupting impact  state proceedings had 
on the outcome, guided by state laws and prerogatives. For better or worse, 
this was consistent with, and continued, our historical tradition. 
  Put another way, if Congress deadlocks, it is up to the 
governor to decide who won his or her state’s electoral vote, and Congress 
must defer to that determination. 
 
 165. See generally 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2005). 
 166. Id.  “[T]he two Houses, acting separately, shall concurrently decide [which] is 
supported by the decision of such State so authorized by its law . . . .”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 167. Id. 
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2. 2000, HAVA, and 2004 
One hundred and twenty-five years after the Tilden-Hayes crisis and the 
passage of the Electoral Count Act, another presidential election crisis 
arose.  This time the dispute was governed by a statutory framework with 
time lines and procedures; an ad hoc institution would not be required to 
settle whether Governor Bush or Vice President Gore had won the 
presidency. 
Unlike the Tilden-Hayes re-canvass, the whole world could watch the 
Bush-Gore aftermath, but as in 1876, it was state law that determined the 
outcome.  Indeed, under Florida law in 2000, the sixty-seven counties’ 
canvassing boards had independent authority to decide whether a voter had 
actually cast a ballot for president, and for whom.168  Guided by a state law 
that directed canvassers to analyze the “intent of the voter,” each board 
inspected punch cards with hanging chads, dimpled chads, and the like.169  
Unfortunately, the Florida legislature had not spelled out what criteria 
ought to be employed in this deliberative process, as had the state of Texas, 
for example.170  Thus, the various boards relied on their own respective 
interpretations of the “intent of the voter” statute.171  Consequently,  for 
example, the standard used by election personnel in Broward County was 
different than in Dade or Volusia County.  Worse, the standard within some 
counties seemed to change from one day to the next.172
As such, though this was about electing the President of the United 
States, the decision-making process for thirty-six days after election day 
was centered on how to count votes under Florida law.  And even though 
the United States Supreme Court eventually ruled that the recount 
procedure violated  the Equal Protection Clause of the United States 
Constitution, Governor Bush’s 537 winning margin had nevertheless been 
cast and  re-canvassed under Florida law.  Moreover, the Supreme Court’s 
decision not to direct the recount process to go forward pursuant to 
procedures that could pass constitutional muster was also based upon 
Florida law  (at least, according to the Supreme Court’s view):
 
173
 
 168. ABNER GREENE, UNDERSTANDING THE 2000 ELECTION: A GUIDE TO THE LEGAL 
BATTLES THAT DECIDED THE PRESIDENCY 34 (2001). 
  the Court 
 169. Id. at 32. 
 170. Id. at 35-38.  An irony of how the Bush and Gore forces attempted to interpret 
Florida’s “intent of the voter” statute was how each sought to refer to or seek distance from 
the Texas law, the only analogous statute in the union that provided indicia of intent with 
great specificity.  That law, of course, had been signed by then-Governor George W. Bush.  
Id. at 36. 
 171. Id. at 34. 
 172. Id. at 71-71. 
 173. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 98, 110-11 (2000). 
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decided not to remand and permit Florida to fashion acceptable recount 
rules because it interpreted state law as requiring a final count in time to be 
impervious to Congressional challenge under 3 U.S.C. § 5.174  Thus, the 
Supreme Court concluded that Florida’s desire to have its electoral votes 
unchallenged in Congress trumped a complete, accurate, and 
constitutionally acceptable recount under Florida law.  Because the Court 
rendered its decision on December 12, 2000,175
Once again, a national institution, this time the venerable Supreme Court 
like the extra-constitutional Electoral Commission  of 1877, decided a 
presidential election, and, again, did so based upon its interpretation of 
state law.  One may question the Supreme Court’s motives or even its 
interpretation of state law as it pertained to Florida’s alleged preference for 
a finalized count to qualify for safe harbor protection,
 the “safe harbor” date 
under 3 U.S.C § 5 that permitted Florida’s presidential electoral college 
slate to be presumptively free from challenge by the House of 
Representatives, the clock had simply run out for Florida to promulgate a 
constitutionally acceptable recount procedure.  Put another way, the United 
States Supreme Court held that the State of Florida’s express desire to have 
its delegation unchallengeable overrode any federal interest in having a 
constitutional standard of vote-counting. 
176
In light of the 2000 voting problems, Congress enacted the Help 
America Vote Act (“HAVA”).
 but there is no 
denying the fact that the Supreme Court rendered a decision based upon its 
interpretation of state law, even though the result determined a presidential 
election. 
177
For example, because so many voters were turned away in 2000 as a 
result of questions about their eligibility, HAVA mandated the use of 
“provisional ballots” that allow a person to cast a ballot subject to later 
verification of registration.
  One might have assumed that given the 
vote counting crisis in Florida, and the political firestorm that it created, 
Congress might have legislated sweeping reforms of the way presidents are 
elected.  Consistent with and reflective of our state-driven electoral system, 
however, the major election reforms pertaining to presidential and other 
federal elections were largely left to the states. 
178
 
 174. (2005); Bush, 531 U.S. at 110-11. 
  But the use, design, method of distribution, 
 175. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 110-11. 
 176. See GREENE, supra note 171, at 122-33.  Professor Greene argues that the Supreme 
Court “goofed” in this regard.  Id. at 122. 
 177. Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 178. See 42 U.S.C. § 15482(a) (2005). 
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and counting of provisional ballots would be dictated by state election 
laws.179  Similarly, responding to the punch card debacle, HAVA provides 
federal grants for new voting technologies.180  Here, too, the states retained 
jurisdiction; each state may decide what kind of voting system to purchase 
and use.181  One of the most troubling aspects of the 2000 Florida voting 
process was that there were different technologies throughout the state, and 
each system had its own error rate.182  Nevertheless, HAVA not only 
permits different states to use different voting technologies for a 
presidential election, but also allows a state to use different systems in its 
several counties.183  As a result, we saw in 2004 a variety of voting systems 
throughout the country, with most states lacking a uniform system even 
within their own borders.184
In addition to different voting technologies, other election features vary 
among the states, including the existence and implementation of re-count 
statutes; the eligibility of felons; the identification voters need at polling 
places; and registration procedures and deadlines.
 
185
Anticipating that the various state laws and directives might result in 
adverse results, numerous groups commenced lawsuits in 2004 prior to 
election day seeking orders that would force states to implement their 
procedures in a manner that broadened the franchise—in effect, to 
  In short, a crazy quilt 
of decentralized election laws dictates how presidential electors are elected, 
and thus who the winner is in the election of inarguably the  most powerful 
person on the planet.  
 
 179. Id. § 15482(a)(4). 
 180. See id. § 15301. 
 181. Id. 
 182. See, e.g., Stephen Ansolabehere & Charles Stewart III, Caltech/MIT Voting Tech. 
Project, Residual Votes Attributable to Technology, 67 POL. 365 (2001) (analyzing the 
relative effectiveness of various voting technologies and noting that replacing punchcard 
ballots with optically scanned-ballots would have resulted in 500,000 more countable votes 
for president in 2000).  
 183. See 42 U.S.C. § 15481(a)(6) (2005). 
 184. See The e-Book On Election Law: An Online Reference Guide, at 
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/ebook/part4/equipment_machines.html (last visited 
Jun. 10, 2005) (listing the voting technologies used in every state). 
 185. See, e.g., Voting Rights for Citizens with Felony Convictions, at http://www.demos-
usa.org/page15.cfm (last visited May 14, 2005); Recounts and Other Remedies,  at 
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/ebook/part5/procedures_recount (last visited May 14, 
2005); Provisional balloting nationwide, at 
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/ebook/part5/provisional02.html (last visited May 14, 
2005); Crashing the Parties: A New Report from The Century Foundation on the Nader 
Campaign and the Debate over Ballot Access, The Century Foundation (Sept. 20, 2004), 
available at www.tcf.org. 
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federalize voting procedures consistent with the alleged intent of HAVA.186  
Arguing generally that HAVA was enacted to increase voting, not to limit 
it, various plaintiffs urged the courts, for example, to expand the use of 
provisional ballots. But, in two of the most hotly contested states in the 
2004 election, Ohio and Florida, the courts ruled that, despite the general 
thrust of HAVA, the votes for presidential electors, provisional ballots 
included, must be counted in conformity with state law.187
Following the 2004 election and the numerous court rulings placing 
HAVA implementation squarely with the states, some efforts were 
commenced to mitigate state-driven shackles and to implement broader, 
nationalized reform.  For example, legislation has been introduced in the 
United States Congress that would preempt state law in a number of 
significant areas, including felon enfranchisement, verifiable paper trails, 
presumptively acceptable voter registrations, and same day registration.
 
188  
Still, the basic foundational premise among many experts and 
commentators remains189
C.  The Constitutional and Statutory Scheme 
 that American presidential elections are state 
affairs, administered and regulated by each of the fifty states and the 
District of Columbia.  It seems, then, after almost two hundred and twenty 
years since the birth of the republic, the more things change, the more they 
stay the same.   
Although there is an historical and statutory preference for a state-driven 
election system, our constitutional framework does provide an overlay of 
Congressional power.  The constitutional provision relating to the election 
 
186. See, e.g., American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations v. 
Hood, 885 So.2d 373 (Fla. 2004); Sandusky County Democratic Party v. Ohio Democratic 
Party, 339 F. Supp. 2d 975 (N.D. Ohio 2004); Bay County Democratic Party v. Land, 347 F. 
Supp. 2d 404 (E.D. Mich. 2004). 
 187. Id. 
 188. See generally Count Every Vote Act of 2005, S.450, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 189. In March 2005, prominent election lawyers and academics from both sides of the 
aisle assembled as The Century Foundation’s Post-2004 Working Group on Election 
Reform. Despite the expertise of the individuals involved, the group’s mission does not 
appear to challenge the state-driven framework: 
The group will assess the key provisions of HAVA, analyze the ways in which 
they were implemented in 2004, and provide guidelines for how they ought to be 
implemented by the states in the future.  In addition, the working group will 
analyze how states are preparing to comply with HAVA requirements . . . [and] 
provide the best policy options for states to meet these mandates . . . . 
Press Release, Century Foundation, The Century Group Assembles Working Group to Help 
States Improve Voting Process (Mar. 23, 2005), available at 
http://www.tcf.org/list.asp?type=PR&pubid=52. 
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of president provides that “Congress may determine the Time of chusing 
the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day 
shall be the same throughout the United States[,]”190 and that “[e]ach state 
shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a 
Number of Electors.”191  The states were thereby given the power to 
determine how to choose electors who will select the President of the 
United States, but Congress was given the authority to make two choices: 
first, to decide whether to enact legislation as to when presidential electors 
would be chosen; second, to decide whether to enact legislation as to when 
the presidential electors would cast their ballots for president.  The 
constitution, therefore, requires only that the members of the electoral 
college cast their ballots for president on the same day.  Congress, on the 
other hand, may alter “election day” as it sees fit.  Indeed, we have already 
seen that, until 1845, states selected their electors at different times.  In that 
year, Congress enacted legislation directing when voters must cast ballots 
for presidential electors:  “The electors of President and Vice President 
shall be appointed, in each State, on the Tuesday next after the first 
Monday in November, in every fourth year succeeding every election of a 
President and Vice President.”192  In fact, even the federal statute that 
includes a requirement for the election of presidential electors on the same 
day includes another provision that acknowledges the possibility of 
multiple-day voting.  The relevant statute, 3 U.S.C § 2, includes a “savings 
clause”:  “Whenever any State has held an election for the purpose of 
choosing electors, and has failed to make a choice on the day prescribed by 
law, the electors may be appointed on a subsequent day in such a manner as 
the legislature of such State may direct.”193
Moreover, on one occasion, Congress expressly granted states the power 
to elect presidential electors over several days.  In the early 1870s, the 
United States enacted electoral reforms amidst the political turmoil from 
  Had the constitution required 
that Congress direct each state to hold elections for the electoral college on 
the same day, it could not have enacted the savings clause. 
 
 190. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 191. Id.  Congress was not required by the Constitution to compel each state to choose its 
electors on the same day—only the day of voting by the electors.  A careful reading of 
Article II, section 2, clause 3 of the Constitution reveals that the second clause, prescribing 
the “same throughout the United States,” refers to and modifies the “Day” on which the 
presidential electors cast their ballots for president—not the “Time” when the people or the 
state legislatures elect the presidential electors.  Congress was, therefore, compelled to set 
the same day for the presidential electors to elect a president and vice president, but not the 
same day for choosing the electors.   
 192. 3 U.S.C. § 1 (2005). 
 193. 3 U.S.C. § 2. 
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ongoing Reconstruction.194  The legislation included one extraordinary 
exception: for the 1872 presidential election only, if a state so chose, its 
voters were permitted to cast ballots for presidential electors for “the 
number of days required.”195
Thus, despite our historical tradition of voters casting ballots for 
presidential electors on a uniform federal election day (albeit with an 
increasing trend by states to allow early voting and more liberal absentee 
balloting), as well as our constitutional deference to state decision-making 
in electoral matters, our history and constitutional framework gives 
Congress the right to alter that practice should the need arise.  Congress 
may, consistent with our history and federal statutes, allow the states to 
make the decision as to whether to take advantage of that option—as it did 
in 1872.  Or, even if Congress is loath to permanently “nationalize” our 
presidential elections, should a uniquely national crisis erupt, Congress has 
the power and could require the states to employ alternative dates and 
procedures for voting for the electoral college. 
  This, too, would have been impossible if the 
constitution required same-day voting for presidential elections. 
V.  CAN CONGRESS STEP UP TO THE PLATE ON TERRORISM? 
Given Congress’s power to legislate a response to the potential chaos 
that a terrorist attack can have on a presidential election, the pertinent 
question remains: Does Congress have the political will to legislate 
national electoral reform and address the unthinkable?  To answer a 
question with another question:  Can Congress afford not to? 
A.  Failing to Act is No Longer an Option 
As the House Resolution passed on July 24, 2004 demonstrates, there is 
a strong sense by governmental officials that terrorists must not be 
permitted to interfere with our way of life, and, in particular, our electoral 
process.  It is extraordinary that the House of Representatives nearly 
unanimously concluded that no federal election should ever be postponed 
in case of an attack.  One can interpret this defiant Resolution in many 
ways, but it must be understood in context.  A review of related legislation 
demonstrates that there is not a total unwillingness to “think the 
unthinkable.”  After all, in the very next session, the House passed a bill to 
permit a relatively speedy process for special elections to the House in the 
event of a massive killing of one hundred or more members of Congress.196
 
 194. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 2d Sess. 3408 (1872)). 
  
 195. Id. 
 196. See Continuity in Representation Act of 2004, H.R. 2844, 108th Cong. § 2(b)(4)(A) 
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And legislation has been introduced to allow a president-elect to 
recommend potential national security and cabinet level appointees so that 
the Senate may confirm them prior to or immediately upon the new 
president taking office.197  This proposal is intended to preserve “continuity 
of governmental operations in the wake of a catastrophic terrorist attack.”  
198
We have seen that, while it is constitutionally a state prerogative to 
choose the method of electing presidential electors, Congress can and did 
exercise its choice to set the date of when electors are chosen.  It did so in 
the 1840s, and with one exception in 1872, has required that all states 
choose the electors on the same day.  Thus, irrespective of how the electors 
are chosen, the entire country consummates its voting for the electoral 
college on one day.  Moreover, as we have also seen, when an election for 
Congress has not been concluded on election day, the federal statute’s 
“savings clause” has permitted, and courts have directed, post-election day 
voting.  There is an analogous savings clause for the electoral college. 
Though it has never been invoked, Congress has delegated to the states the 
same power to establish procedures for post-election day voting in 
presidential elections
 
199 as it has in Congressional elections.200
No state, however, has used its authority to legislate parameters as to 
when or how to exercise such power should the need arise.  This omission 
may have been unremarkable prior to September 11, but the continuing 
failure after the attack is, at the very least, surprising.  Were there to be an 
attack on or right before a presidential election, the affected states would 
presumably exercise their powers under 3 U.S.C. § 2 by relying upon 
general plenary powers relating to emergencies.  Indeed, in its Resolution 
against the postponing of a federal election in the face of a terrorist attack, 
the House of Representative said that “there is no reason to believe that the 
men and women who administer elections in jurisdictions across the nation 
would be incapable of determining how to react to a terrorist attack.”
  There is, 
therefore, no reason that the states could not do so should exigent 
circumstances prevent the conclusion of voting for presidential electors on 
election day. 
201
But, all good intentions aside, in the absence of any preemptive federal 
legislation as to how to proceed under these circumstances, some states 
 
 
(2004). 
 197. H.R. Res. 775, 108th Cong. (2004). 
 198. Id. 
 199. See 3 U.S.C. § 2 (2005). 
 200. See 2 U.S.C. § 7 (2005). 
 201. H.R. 728, 108th Cong. (2004). 
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might choose to suspend the election during an emergency and some might 
not.  If there is another attack in the financial center of New York City on 
election day, for example, the governor of Ohio may determine that there is 
no reason to suspend voting in his state.  On the other hand, if Amtrak 
trains are blown up outside Cleveland, Miami, Atlanta, and Las Vegas, 
would the governors of New York and California, assuming they had the 
powers to make the decision, feel comfortable insisting that the voting in 
their states proceed?  What criteria would each of these governors rely 
upon in making their decision? 
If an attack were leveled against only New York and Washington, D.C., 
which together total only thirty-six electoral college votes, would the 
remaining states continue the election, and if an electoral majority were 
reached, would it count?  A majority could be obtained without those 
traditionally Democratic votes, but could voters from New York and D.C. 
persuade a federal court to enjoin the casting of ballots by presidential 
electors in the remaining state capitols?  New York and D.C. would have 
several weeks (from the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November 
until the second Wednesday in December) to complete the postponed 
election.  But if they were not able to, because all voting records in 
Democratic New York City were destroyed, and a Republican state 
legislature refused to permit same-day registration, could New York 
successfully enjoin the casting of the ballots by the electoral college in 
December on the ground that all presidential electors were constitutionally 
required to vote on the same day?  Unfortunately, even in the face of 
another attack on the United States, partisan politics might come into play. 
Substitute Florida in 2000 for the New York and D.C. example.  Assume 
terrorists attack polling sites in Miami Beach, Ft. Lauderdale, and Boca 
Raton by suicide bombers on election day.  Governor Jeb Bush inspects the 
damage where poll workers are killed and all registration records are 
incinerated.  He personally visits the many condo communities where lives 
have been lost, and demonstrates his deep and heartfelt sympathies for the 
survivors.  But he also allows the presidential election to proceed in the rest 
of the state.  After the polls close, the electoral college vote in the rest of 
the nation is tight as a drum, with neither side winning a majority and 
Florida deciding the outcome.  When the votes are finally counted in 
Florida (including those that were cast early in the morning in the three 
decimated cities), then-Governor George Bush wins Florida by some 
20,000 votes.  Perhaps Jeb Bush considers postponing the election in the 
three affected counties, but decides that the re-creation of registration 
records would take at least six months, and does not think that the country 
could wait to resolve the presidential election.  Accordingly, he certifies the 
Republican slate of electors pledged to his brother.   
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 Open to question is whether Jeb Bush would have had the authority to 
continue the election in the rest of the state?  One might argue that the 
Pennsylvania flooding case202
If the hypothetical terrorist attack occurred in Republican-leaning 
counties rather than in the Democratic-leaning communities as suggested 
above, could Governor Bush postpone the election in those affected 
counties while the rest of the state continued to vote?  Based upon the 
Pennsylvania case, perhaps he could, but political considerations might 
very well persuade him to call off the election in the entire state, and then 
the Republicans might be the ones seeking to enjoin the electoral college 
vote.  The issue, of course, is whether it is possible to eliminate an 
outcome-determinative political calculation in such decision-making, or is 
it simply inevitable for politics to come into play? 
  supports his position.  One might also argue 
that the absence of any specific federal or state law regarding exigent 
circumstances in a presidential election prevents him from halting the 
election in the rest of the state.  On the other hand, could the Democrats 
fairly claim that that the voters of Florida had “failed to elect” their 
presidential electors in that three counties had lost their opportunity to 
vote?  And, if so, could the balloting in the various state capitols on 
December 18, 2000 be enjoined if destroyed voting records prevented a 
postponed election day so soon after the attack? 
The problem with these scenarios, of course, is that decisions of whether 
and how to respond to an exigent circumstance, even one as catastrophic 
and far-reaching as an attack on the homeland during a presidential 
election, are left to the states, with no clear federal or state guidelines. 
It gets worse.  If these hypotheticals are modified to include attacks in 
several states, some states might choose to postpone the election in part of 
a state, but not in other parts of the state.  Some may choose to postpone 
the voting throughout the state.  Some may choose to simply accept the 
vote totals without completed voting in the damaged areas.  Unless various 
states chose to consult and agree, the adopted procedures could vary, and 
even the dates of postponed election days may not be the same from state 
to state. 
Obviously, we are indeed fortunate that these “nightmare scenarios” 
have not occurred.  The closest we have come is the postponed mayoral 
election in New York City on September 11, 2001.  If an attack disrupted a 
future presidential election, the chances of litigation would almost certainly 
be higher. After all, the shock and surprise of another attack would not be 
 
 202. See generally In re General Election—1985, 531 A.2d 836 (Pa. 1987); supra Part 
II.B. 
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as great as it was on September 11; and the stakes and partisan emotions 
could not be more intense than during a race for the White House. 
While it is certainly understandable, from a political and emotional 
perspective, for Congress to take a defiant stand against the possibility of 
an attack against our electoral process, one need not be an alarmist to 
conclude that it is quite irresponsible not to act prophylactially.  As a 
constitutional matter, Congress has the authority to set the date of the 
voting and has done so in a manner that acknowledges the possibility that 
voting on election day might not be complete.  Instead of permitting the 
state-driven electoral system to dictate what would happen in the event of a 
crisis—which could result in disparate solutions by the affected states, and 
a possible constitutional crisis surrounding the composition of whatever 
electoral college was elected—Congress should exercise its authority as 
well as its responsibility to enact a uniform set of procedures to determine 
when and how to proceed in the face of extraordinarily exigent 
circumstances such as a terrorist attack on or immediately before a 
presidential election. 
There is no question that we are burdened by our history.  For Congress 
to act in this way would no doubt be viewed as a break from our long 
tradition of delegating these issues to states, but the potential constitutional 
chaos that might ensue requires a new approach.  The chance of terrorism 
or a major natural disaster occurring on or immediately before our 
quadrennial election day is extremely remote, but prudence dictates action. 
B. The Time is Ripe; Some Suggestions 
A special Congressional task force should be appointed to study the 
issue.  Hearings should be convened, inviting constitutional and election 
law scholars, state and federal elected officials, political scientists, state 
election administrators, and citizens.  Legislation should be proposed and 
debated. 
The time is ripe.  We have recovered from September 11, 2001, and held 
a presidential election.  Significantly, the next presidential election will 
have no incumbent running for re-election, and no vice president seeking 
the presidency.  As such, the tension of partisanship, ever present when 
formulating electoral procedures, is somewhat reduced.  And, of course, it 
is better to design rules and guidelines in the absence of emergency or 
necessity. 
There is no talismanic solution, but I have several suggestions. 
1. Congressional Action 
When the President of the United States gives the State of the Union to a 
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joint session of Congress each January, at least one cabinet Secretary stays 
away to ensure presidential succession should there be a massive attack on 
the Capitol.  Obviously, the odds of this occurring are marginal, but caution 
dictates preparedness to ensure continuity of our government. 
Similarly, Congress should, every four years, appoint an Extraordinary 
Presidential Election Contingencies Committee.  Its members would 
consist of representatives of the candidates of the major parties and any 
independent candidate or minor party polling at least ten percent of the 
popular vote or qualifying for matching campaign funds.  Anticipating 
extraordinarily exigent circumstances such as a terrorist attack or a 
widespread natural disaster on or immediately preceding election day, this 
Committee would set certain guidelines as to how to proceed.  Should such 
an attack occur, the Committee would immediately decide whether the 
election should go forward, if any state or part thereof should postpone its 
voting, and, if so, when, and any other relevant procedural matters.  The 
Committee would be directed to consult with the governors of the various 
affected states, and the presidential and vice presidential candidates. 
This kind of Committee’s biggest advantage is its centralized 
authority—or national perspective—a single body with decision-making 
authority should the unthinkable occur.  The various candidates’ interests 
would be taken into account, and, theoretically, the higher national interest 
would be determinative.  The election would not rely upon various states 
making potentially contradictory decisions based upon a hodge-podge of 
state laws.  The drawback is that the Committee is similar to the extra-legal 
Electoral Commission Congress appointed to resolve the Tilden-Hayes 
election in 1876. 
Better yet, then, rather than having Congress delegating its authority on 
such a weighty and extraordinary matter to an ad hoc group reminiscent of 
the 1876 Commission, Congress could appoint its own bipartisan 
leadership as the Committee.  In this case, Congress would be affirmatively 
assuming responsibility for the timing and procedures of the presidential 
election during extraordinarily exigent circumstances.  This would be 
preferable because the United States Congress would be assuming its 
historical and constitutional role in electing the president and vice president 
of the United States, albeit under different circumstances than our Founders 
contemplated. Yet Americans would no doubt accept the authority and 
competence of the Congress to exercise this power. 
Better still, Congress ought to enact permanent procedures that address 
this exigency, providing guidelines as to how decisions should be made, 
and by whom.  As such, Congress would be taking the initiative and 
establishing a national response to a national emergency, rather than 
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leaving the constitutional crisis to be “managed” by the various states. 
2. Guidelines 
If and when Congress decides to assume its responsibilities regarding a 
possible terrorist attack on the United States during or immediately 
preceding a presidential election, it should set forth specific guidelines as to 
how to proceed.  Just as Congress grappled with what ultimately became 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Constitution regarding issues of a 
disabled president and vacancies in the office of vice presidency, here, too, 
a legislative solution will not come easily or quickly.  Nevertheless, there 
are certain issues that must be addressed. 
Here are some suggestions to guide decision-making, offered as model 
legislation: 
(a) the election for presidential electors should be postponed  only in 
those counties in a state where extraordinary exigent circumstances have 
interfered with the voting process; 
(b) for the purpose of this guideline, “interfered with the voting process” 
should include, but not be limited to: 
 (i) destruction of voting machine(s), registration rolls, or ballots 
cast; 
 (ii) prevention of voters’ access to polling site(s); 
 (iii) widespread loss of communication; 
 (iv) compromised integrity of polling site(s), or 
 (v) unsafe conditions. 
(c) should the voting of a county be postponed, only those voters whose 
ballots have been compromised should be allowed to cast a new vote at the 
postponed election date; all votes that have been cast prior to the 
postponement of an election, as long as the integrity of the ballot has not 
been compromised, should be considered inviolate; 
(d) should the voting of a county be postponed, there should be no 
canvassing of the ballots of that state for president or any other public 
office until all votes are cast at the postponed election; further, in the states 
where the election is not postponed, there should be no canvassing of the 
ballots for president or any other public office until the votes are all cast at 
the postponed election in the states that are affected; and, 
(e) all voting equipment and all votes cast, whether in counties where the 
election is postponed or in other counties in the affected state where voting 
is postponed, as well as in unaffected states, should, at the close of the polls 
on election day, be impounded and placed under the jurisdiction of the 
highest court of the state or their representatives until all postponed election 
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day voting is completed. 
Although I believe that these suggestions are fair and sensible, they are 
merely a starting point for Congress, and, I hope, an incentive for Congress 
to begin the process of enacting a national procedure to protect our 
electoral system. 
 
  CONCLUSION 
If the attack on the World Trade Center had occurred ten months earlier, 
on November 7, 2000, the United States would have been totally 
unprepared as to whether or how to conduct the presidential election of 
2000. When there was an attack during the New York City Mayoral 
primary election in 2001, the unique shock of the event dwarfed any 
concern about postponing that election or the procedures to be followed.  
Having already lived through that trauma, however, and having watched 
Spain’s voters become overwhelmed by a terrorist attack immediately 
before its national election, Americans would no doubt find it unacceptable 
should such an attack disrupt a presidential election and create the kind of 
chaotic constitutional crisis that is likely to occur without any plan in place. 
Congress has the power and responsibility to fix this.  It should. 
 
